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Abstract. In this thesis, the effects of institutional structure of Turkey on economic 
performance are analyzed by using the notions of transaction cost and credible commitment 
whicharecontributed by the New Institutional Economics (NIE). According to this school, 
neoclassicaleconomics ignores transaction costs, bounded rationality, incomplete contracts, 
andpropertyrights. Hence, neoclassical models can not represent the real world. But it 
iswell-known that the transactioncostsare seldom nil in our daily life. Starting from this 
point of view, we examinethe issues of institutions and NIE and the relationship between 
institutions and economic performance. Then, defining, measuring, and effects of the 
transaction costs arediscussed. Afterwards weanalyze the political transaction costs. Next, 
the policymaking process andcredible commitment are explained. The role of institutions 
on formation of institutionalpolicies, the 3 determiner power(legislative-executive-
judiciary), and the separation of powersare discussed, so that credible commitment is 
clarified in this context. Having underlined the theoreticalframework of these issues, 
Turkey's progress is reviewed. Some of the significant contributionsof thisthesis are 
defining the politicaltransaction cost and credible commitment and after showing the effects 
of Turkey'sinstitutional structure on economic performance by using time series analysis 
with structralbreaks in accordance with the NIE perspective. Our findings indicate that the 
transaction cost and credible commitment are strictly important on investment decisions 
and national income.. 
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Highlights 
* Effects of corporate structure in Turkey to economic performance are analyzed. 
* Institutions, transaction cost, political process and credible commitment literature is 
reviewed. 
* Simultaneous co-integration with structural-breaks analysis is performed with the data 
obtained from ICRG. 
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Summary 
n this thesis, the relationship between institutional structure and economic 
performance in Turkey is analyzed through transaction cost and credible 
commitment whichareintroducedby the NIE. There is a significant literature 
claiming that the institutional structure in a country specifies the transaction cost 
and the credibility of the economic activity and thus these two variableaffect the 
investment decisions of economic agents (North, 1990; Levy and Spiller, 1996; 
Spiller, 2012). In this context, this thesis aims to define the transaction cost and 
credibility of Turkey’s institutional structure and to show the effects of them on 
investments and economic growth.  
Transaction costs are defined as research and information costs, contract and 
decision costs, monitoring and enforcement costs. The level of the transaction cost 
is determined by the institutional structure. One of the most important factors 
affectingthe institutional structure is political institutions. Political institutions may 
reduce political transaction costs through securing the property rights and enforcing 
contracts. Such an environment would have positive impact on the investment 
decisions and so that economic performance would improve.  
Besides transaction costs, the second important factor affecting the relationship 
between institutions and economic performance is credible commitment. Credible 
commitment determined by political process is one of the main determinants of 
investment decisions. As long as the policymaking process of a country works 
efficiently, credible policies could be constituted. Principally, the institutions 
generating the political process are legislative, executive, and judiciary. If these 
political institutions are operated efficiently, transparently, andharmonized with 
each other,commitment could be credible since the institutional structure will have 
consistency and certainty as working in a perspective of legal based and 
nondiscretionary way.  
When analyzing the changes of Turkey’s institutional structure to date, due to 
the absence of efficient institutions, economic performance follows a discontinuous 
path. The attitude of the state in legal structure and property rights blocks assurance 
of the credible commitment. Although an institutional evolution started in Turkish 
economy during 1980s, because of the problems such as continuous coalitions in 
1990s, not fulfillinginstitutional reforms, stability and balance problems between 
the powers, transaction costs in political process were kept in a high level and the 
investments remained low. On the other hand, the economy gained a positive trend 
with the developments in the institutional structure after 2000s. These were 
stability and fiscal discipline, reform packages for EU target, independent 
regulatory agencies and efficient regulations caused by one-party government.  
Due to the measurement restrictions, in our econometric analysisthe indices 
obtained from ICRG database areutilized to represent these two variables. Political 
risk rating index represents the political transaction cost and investment profile 
index represents the credible commitment.  The data is estimated by Johansen, 
Mosconi and Nielsen (2000) simultaneous cointegration with structural breaks 
approach. The findings of the models, in which three different breaks (internal and 
external) used, comply with our expectations. Accordingly, assurance of 
institutional structure, which makes progress in credible commitment, increases 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Otherwise, if the institutional structure is unable to 
provide credible commitment to agents, FDI decreases. Likewise, minimizing the 
political transaction costs decreases GDP and vice versa. According to the other 
findings, the effects of the interest rate and FDI in Turkey on economic 
performance are in accordance with the economic theory. However, the impact of 
the institutional structure to economic performance is superior to these variables. 
I 
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Additionally, when we comparecoalition and one-party periods, it’s deduced that 
one-party government creates positive effects on economic performance 
byreducingthe transaction costs and increasing the credibility. 
According to these results, the institutional structure of Turkey should 
attentively be designed for getting better economic results. The indicator for 
generating an efficient political process is to compose a mechanism which will 
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